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Abstract. We study routing games where every agent sequentially de-
cides her next edge when she obtains the green light at each vertex. Be-
cause every edge only has capacity to let out one agent per round, an edge
acts as a FIFO waiting queue that causes congestion on agents who enter.
Given n agents over |V | vertices, we show that for one agent, approxi-
mating a winning strategy within n1−ε of the optimum for any ε > 0, or
within any polynomial of |V |, are PSPACE-hard. Under perfect informa-
tion, computing a subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) is PSPACE-hard
and in FPSPACE. Under imperfect information, deciding SPE existence
is PSPACE-complete.
Keywords: Sequential Routing Games · Computational Complexity
1 Introduction
Models for routing games stem from applications in road traffic [War52] and
packet routing via Internet Protocol [KP99]. Many agents share a same routing
network (a graph of vertices and edges) without any central authority, and each
agent decides a path, with the individualistic goal to minimize her delay. How-
ever, by using the shared resources of the network, agents incur congestion to
one another: they play a game. Static routing games, where every individual’s
decided path congests its edges all at once, made history as the first applica-
tion for the Price of Anarchy (PoA), a measure for the loss of efficiency due
to selfish behaviors [RT02,Rou05,CK05,AAE05,NRTV07,Rou09]. Static routing
games, being potential games, also have the very satisfying property that a best-
response dynamics always converges to a pure Nash equilibrium (PNE).
However, static models do not reflect the temporality of travels. Indeed,
an agent, when on one edge of her path, should not be congesting the other
edges. In routing games over time, every agent travels through time as well
as along the edges of her path. This more recent model was also deeply stud-
ied [KS09,AU09,HMRT09,WHK14,HPSVK16,Ism17,HPS+18]. Although natu-
ral, adding such temporality in delays calculations increases the complexity of
games: pure-strategy Nash equilibria may not exist; computing a best-response
or an equilibrium are computationally intractable; the PoA can be large.
Still, a last temporal aspect is missing from routing games over time. Al-
though the locality of congestion was related with the time at which it occurs,
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agents might also make decisions along time. Sequential routing games were
introduced even more recently [CCCW17a,CCCW17b]. Every agent, when she
reaches any node, is allowed to observe previous actions, in order to decide the
next course of actions, like the next edge on her path. In this sequential set-
ting, winning strategies and subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) are standard
concepts for individual rationality and a stable game outcome.
Related Work. There is a rich literature on routing games over time. In
[HHP06,HHP09], there are multiple asymmetric commodities that are routed in
a sequence. The cost of edges is an affine function of the load. For splittable
commodities, the PoA is almost four, and for unsplittable ones it is 3 + 2
√
2.
The best-response problem is NP-hard. [KS09,KS11] generalizes deterministic
queuing into competitive flows over time. In this non-atomic symmetric model,
an edge’s outflow is determined by its capacity, and also has a fixed transit de-
lay. An iterative algorithm is proposed, where ε-Nash flows converge to a Nash
flow. [AU09] studies routing games with non-atomic asymmetric agents. While
for symmetric agents, a PNE is guaranteed to exist and efficiently computable,
in the asymmetric case and under FIFO, an equilibrium may not exist. The PoA
is bounded from below by the number of vertices. [HMRT09,HMRT11] pro-
poses temporal network congestion games. Every edge has a processing speed
ae ∈ R>0, and various local policies are studied. Under FIFO, edge e processes
one agent in time ae, while the other agents wait. In the unweighted symmetric
case, despite the NP-hardness of computing a best-response, a PNE can always
be efficiently computed. Otherwise, an equilibrium may not exist. While costs
in [KS09] where rationals, [WHK14] focuses on atomic agents and integer time-
steps. Every edge is associated with a capacity (maximal flow-per-time-step)
and a fixed transit delay. A PNE may not exist; the best-response problem is
NP-complete; PNE verification is coNP-complete; PNE existence is at least NP-
hard; a bound is provided on the PoA. [HPSVK16,HPS+18] studies a model
related to [WHK14]. The focus is on local and overall priorities on the edges.
(Crossovers may occur.) Several bounds on the price of stability and PoA are
shown. It is APX-hard to compute optimal priority lists. Under local priorities,
the best-response and PNE problem are NP-hard. [Ism17] studies a model re-
lated to [HPSVK16] and similar to [WHK14] under FIFO. Best-responses are
inapproximable, and deciding whether a PNE exists is complete for class ΣP2 .
Concerning sequential routing games, [CCCW17b,CCCW17a] are the first to
propose a model where agents take new decisions on each vertex. In this very
interesting setting, when several agents arrive on the same edge during the same
round, ties are broken by an order on incoming edges. It allows for plays that do
not depend on agents’ IDs. It also guarantees the existence of a subgame perfect
equilibrium (when all agents share the same sink), in a constructive way: the
iterative dominating path profile algorithm [CCCW17b, Alg. 1] outputs a path
profile induced by an SPE. It is also reminded that an SPE might not exist when
one uses an overall order on agents for tiebreaking [CCCW17b, Ex. 2].
Besides, [PV10] studies a new model where decisions are made by nodes
instead of flows. There is also a diverse literature on repeated routing games,
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where sequentiality comes from a repetition of static routing games (see e.g.
[BEDL06,Rou09,CS11] or [MBP17] in real life). While it is well known that
problem QSAT (also known as TQBF) is PSPACE-complete [GJ79], the Cana-
dian Traveler Problem [PY91] was an inspiration for settling our complexities.
Our contributions.Here, we study sequential routing games that are played
on a digraph, round after round. W.l.o.g. on negative results, we assume that
every edge has capacity and length one. Every agent has to travel from her
source-vertex to her sink-vertex in as few rounds as she can. Congestion is mod-
eled by a very natural FIFO queuing policy on every edge: agents who enter
the edge are queued, and an edge lets out one agent per round. At every round,
the top agents of all waiting lists pop out from their current edges, decide their
next edges and queue there. More precisely, we study an imperfect information
setting where the top agents decide their next edges simultaneously, and a per-
fect information setting where they decide in an ordered sequence. We study the
computational complexity of standard rationality and stability concepts, and
show the following results in both sequential and simultaneous action settings.
Th. 1 Deciding whether an agent has a strategy that will guarantee her total
delay below a given threshold is PSPACE-complete.
Th. 2 Let n be the number of agents and |V | the number of vertices. Ap-
proximating an agent’s optimal strategy within n1−ε for any ε > 0,
and within any polynomial of |V | are both PSPACE-hard.
Th. 3 Under perfect information, computing a subgame perfect equilibrium
is PSPACE-hard and in FPSPACE. Under imperfect information, de-
ciding SPE existence is PSPACE-complete.
2 Preliminaries
We introduce relevant notation on routing games and sequential games. Without
loss of generality on negative results, edges have unitary length and capacity. 3
Definition 1 (Sequential First-in-first-out Routing Game (FRoG)).
A FRoG is characterized by a tuple (G = (V,E), N, (si, s
∗
i )i∈N ) where:
– G = (V,E) is a finite digraph with vertex set V and edges4 E ⊆ V × V ,
– finite set N = {1, . . . , n} is the set of agents, and
– for every agent i, vertex si ∈ V is her source and s∗i ∈ V \ {si} her sink. ⋄
For every edge e, set F (e) ⊆ E denotes the successors of e: all the edges whose
tail is the head of e.5 For every agent i, starting from her source si, the goal is
to travel a path6 πi that reaches her sink s
∗
i , by deciding a successor edge each
3 A similar assumption (unitary length and capacity) is made in [CCCW17b]. Since the
present hardness results still hold in this particular case, it means that computational
complexity does not come from numbers defining length and capacity.
4 An edge e = (ue, ve) is a couple of vertices. Its tail (resp. head) is ue (resp. ve).
5 Vertices are mere connections. Edges are the only decided and time-costly resources.
6 A path is a finite list of edges such that for two consecutive edges the head of the
former is the tail of the later. We allow edge repetitions and directed cycles. We
assume that there always exists a path from si to s
∗
i .
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time she reaches a head. Every edge e acts as a FIFO queuing list7 Qe on agents:
every agent who enters e is queued in Qe.
A game is played sequentially over rounds r ∈ N. Here is the main loop: once
per round, every non-empty list Qe simultaneously pops its first agent i, who
simultaneously decides her next edge e′ in successors F (e), and enters waiting
queue Qe′ . If the head of edge e is already i’s sink s
∗
i , she simply exits the system.
(If two agents arrive on the same edge at the same time, rules are precised later.)
Congestion comes from the fact that edges let out at most one agent per round.
If the game ends in a finite number of rounds8, every agent reached her sink,
and the outcome is a path-profile (π1, . . . , πn) ∈ P1× . . .×Pn, which we denote
in bold by pi ∈ P, and where Pi denotes the set of finite paths from agent i’s
source si to her sink s
∗
i . Informally, the total-delay (defined later) that an agent
i seeks to minimize is Ci(pi) =
∑|πi|
ℓ=1 wi(pi, ℓ) where wi(pi, ℓ) ∈ N≥1 is agent i’s
position in waiting list Qπi(ℓ) when she enters edge πi(ℓ).
Example 1. In this FRoG, vertices are circles, edges (with unitary capacities
and delays) are arrows. Agent 1 (resp. 2) start from a (resp. b). Both go to k,
under simultaneous actions and agent priority 2 ≻ 1 (see tiebreaking rule (RO)).
a b
c
d
e
f
g
h
i
j
k
1 2
1 2
Definition 2 (Consecutive Configurations and History). For every round
r ∈ N, configuration Q(r) = (Qe(r))e∈E is defined as the ordered contents of
every waiting list, before tops are popped to end round r and agents decide their
next edges.9 A history H(r) = (Q(0), . . . , Q(r)) is a sequence of consecutive
configurations: from history H(r), if configuration Q(r) is non-empty, we obtain
a consecutive configuration Q(r + 1) by the following decisions.
a. For round r = 0, all the agents simultaneously decide their first edge (with
tail si), and get queued there, defining Q(1).
b. Now, we focus on the agents who need to make a decision:
For round r ≥ 1, let set MH(r) be every agent i on top of a queue Qe(r) s.t.
F (e) 6= ∅ and the head of edge e is not her sink s∗i . All the agents in MH(r)
simultaneously pop and decide their next edges e′ ∈ F (e), queuing in the
corresponding waiting lists Qe′(r + 1), and thus defining Q(r + 1).
c. For round r ≥ 1, every agent i on top of a queue Qe(r) s.t. the head of edge
e is i’s sink s∗i pops and exits the system with total-delay Ci = r. If F (e) = ∅
and the head is not her sink, she exists with total-delay Ci =∞.
7 A queuing list admits two operations: queuing and popping. Under FIFO ordering,
queuing adds an agent at the end of the list, and popping takes the first agent.
8 An agent can cycle or decide to get stuck somewhere with no way to reach her sink.
9 While Q(0) is empty, for r ≥ 1, configuration (Qe(r))e∈E is a partition of the agents
still in the system. Agents on top of queues in Q(r) decide a new edge at round r.
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For round r ≥ 0, the set of all possible histories is denoted by H(r). ⋄
Definition 3 (Game-tree). The game-tree Γ = (H,Q) is defined as follows.
– Nodes are all possible histories: H = ⋃r≥0H(r). History H(0) is the root.
– For any round r ≥ 0, a transition from history H(r) to (H(r), Q(r + 1))
exists in Q if and only if Q(r + 1) is a consecutive configuration for H(r).
Given game-tree Γ = (H,Q) and history H(r) ∈ H, we define Γ [H(r)] the
subtree rooted on H(r). It also defines the subgame starting from H(r). ⋄
The game-tree is a (possibly infinite) tree graph which entirely describes
how the game can be played. On each node/history, agents make their decisions,
branching into a consecutive history, until all agents reached their sink.
Definition 4 (Strategy). For agent i, a strategy σi is a function which maps
every history H(r) in which agent i has to decide a new edge (i.e. agent i belongs
to MH(r)) to her next edge. Let Σi denote the set of possible strategies for σi. A
strategy-profile (σ1, . . . , σn) ∈ Σ1× . . .×Σn, which we denote in bold by σ ∈ Σ,
defines a strategy σi for every agent i, along with an adversary profile σ−i.
A strategical (resp. trivial) agent is an agent for who there is more than one
(resp. exactly one) si − s∗i−path. ⋄
A strategy could be a huge or infinite object, representing it entirely is in-
tractable. Instead, one may assume that an agent has her own polynomial-time
algorithm for deciding her next edge, function of current configuration or history.
A FRoG ends in a finite number of rounds if an agent never decides to go
where there is no path to her sink and never visits the same vertex/edge twice
(e.g. if G is acyclic or as a strategy).
Definition 5 (Induced path-profile). Given strategy-profile σ, agents play
their strategies on the game. If the game ends in a finite number of rounds, then
it generates one finite sequence of edges per agent: a unique path-profile pi(σ).⋄
Definition 6 (Total-delay). For every agent i and path-profile pi, let Ci(pi)
be the total-delay of agent i: the round when she reaches her sink s∗i and exits
the system. It can be defined as Ci(pi) =
∑|πi|
ℓ=1 wi(pi, ℓ) where wi(pi, ℓ) ∈ N≥1 is
agent i’s position in waiting list Qπi(ℓ) when she enters edge πi(ℓ).
Function Ci extends to strategy-profilesσ by mapping from path-profile pi(σ)
if the game ends in a finite number of rounds. Otherwise, an agent who reaches
her goal in a finite number of rounds has this number as a total delay, and an
agent who doesn’t get delay Ci(σ) =∞. Furthermore, function Ci(σ | H(r)) is
agent i’s total-delay when strategies σ are played starting from history H(r),
that is in subgame Γ [H(r)]. ⋄
It is worth noting that a path-profile (π1, . . . , πn) can be mapped in polyno-
mial time to total delays (C1(pi), . . . , Cn(pi)) by mean of a Dijkstra-style pop-
the-next-event algorithm similar to [HPSVK16, Prop 2.2] or [Ism17, Th. 2].
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Definition 7 (Subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE)). Given a FRoG, an
SPE is a strategy-profile (σ1, . . . , σn) such that in game-tree Γ = (H,Q), for any
history H(r) ∈ H, any agent i in MH(r) and any deviation σ′i ∈ Σi, one has:
Ci(σ | H(r)) ≤ Ci(σ′i,σ−i | H(r)). ⋄
In other words, in any subgame, strategy-profile σ is a pure Nash equilibrium.
When an SPE is played, the game always ends in a finite number of rounds,
since it is in players’ interests.
Example 2. We depict below the game-tree of Example 1. Every rectangle rep-
resents the set of deciding agents MH(r). On every transition, we represent the
edges decided. Total delays are 2-vectors on leaves. SPEs are in bold.
1
22
1,212(6, 5)
(6, 5)
(5, 4)(4, 5)
(5, 4)(5, 5)(4, 5)(5, 5)(5, 4)
(a, c)(a, e)
(d, f)(d, g)(d, f)(d, g)
(f, i)(f, i)
(f, i)(f, j)(f, j)(f, i)
(f, j)(f, j)(f, i)(f, j)(f, i)(f, j)
2.1 Discussion on Tie-breaking, Actions, Information and Existence
In the simultaneous-action setting defined above, several agents may simultane-
ously queue on a same waiting list Qe, during a same round, hence a tie breaking
rule for who queues first is required. Two exist in literature:
(RO) There is an overall order ≻ on agents, and those with the higher priority
queue first. However, in this case, an SPE is not guaranteed to exist.10
(See e.g. [CCCW17b, Fig. 2].)
(RE) For every vertex u, a priority ≻u is defined on incoming edges. If all
agents share same sink, an SPE is guaranteed to exist [CCCW17b, Sec.
3]. However, if sinks are different, an SPE is not guaranteed.11
The simultaneousness of decisions in each round, induces imperfect informa-
tion: agents in set MH(r) do not know what the others decide at round r. In
order to obtain a setting with sequential actions and perfect information, which
guarantees existence of an SPE by backward induction, we use the same setting
as above, with the following change that slices rounds into agent turns.
(RR) Agents in MH(r) (instead of deciding simultaneously) take turn w.r.t. an
agent order 1 ≻ . . . ≻ n for deciding their next edge and queue there.
Hence, only one agent per (slice of) round makes a decision and acts.
10 Here, we do not consider mixed strategies.
11 See e.g. the pursuer-follower counter-example in [Ism17, Fig. 1]. The same construc-
tion, but with priorities on incoming edges, is strategically equivalent. Moreover,
since the only two strategical agents decide everything simultaneously on the first
round, pure Nash equilibrium and SPE coincide (as an empty concept there).
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2.2 Computational problems studied
The main issue lies in settling the complexity12 of computing a subgame perfect
equilibrium (when it always exists), or of deciding whether one exists (if it may
not). While the length function of FRoGs is polynomial in |V | and n, a strategy
σ is by definition an output of intractable length. Therefore, when SPE is guar-
anteed, computation of its induced path profile is a more formalizable problem.
We explore this sequence of problems, where R refers to rules (RO) and (RR):
FRoG/R/Br: Given a FRoG, an agent i, an adversary path-profile pi−i
and a threshold θ ∈ N, decide whether there is a path πi
with total delay Ci(πi,pi−i) ≤ θ.
FRoG/R/Win: Given a FRoG, an agent i and a threshold θ ∈ N, decide
whether there is a strategy σi that guarantees her total
delay Ci(σi,σ−i) ≤ θ for any adversary strategy σ−i.
FRoG/RO/Exist: Given a FRoG, does it admit an SPE?
FRoG/RR/Find: Given a FRoG, find a path-profile induced by an SPE.
3 The Complexity of Winning Strategies
In this section, we show that deciding whether an agent has a winning strategy
(one that grants her total delay below some threshold) is PSPACE-complete
under simultaneous actions (RO) and sequential actions (RR).
Theorem 1. FRoG/R/Win is PSPACE-complete under (RO) and (RR).
The remainder of this section consists in the proof of Th. 1. In Def. 8, we
first define gadget games that allow preference inversions which break Bellman’s
principle and cause computational intractability. Then, for didactic reasons, in
Lem. 2, we consider a best-response decision problem related to [Ism17, Th. 3],
which lets us introduce smoothly an original many-one reduction from 3SAT that
is then generalized to QSAT by reusing the same structure and gadget-games.
Definition 8 (Loosener). Given a FRoG, an agent i, a trigger couple (e, r)
of an edge and a round, and m consequence couples (g1, rg1 ), . . . , (gm, rgm) of
an edge and a round, a loosener is a piece of FRoG defined under (RO) as in
Figure 1, with the minor assumption that rgj ≥ r + 5 + j, for any 1 ≤ j ≤ m. ⋄
Lemma 1. In a loosener, if agent i reaches trigger-edge e on trigger-round r,
then her delay on any consequence-edge gj in consequence-round rgj is decreased
by one round. (An agent with higher priority than i and that was arriving on gj
at rgj is delayed by one.) Furthermore, the loosener is not a shortcut for i: her
cost for going through it from round r or later is arbitrarily large.
12 We assume as common knowledge: decision and function problem, length function,
complexity classes P, NP, PSPACE and FPSPACE, many-to-one reduction, hard-
ness, completeness and decision problems 3SAT and QSAT (also known as TQBF).
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e f0 f1 f2 fj fm
f1,α
f1,β
f1,γ
g1
f2,α
f2,β
f2,γ
g2
fj,α
fj,β
fj,γ
gj
fm,α
fm,β
fm,γ
gm
r
r + 1 r + 2 + 1 r + 2 + 2 r + 2 + j r + 2 +m
r + 4 + 1 r + 4 + 2 r + 4 + j r + 4 +m
r + 2
If agent i does not enter e on round r:
• agent blue is on time,
• green agents are delayed by blue,
• gold agents are on time.
If agent i enters edge e on round r:
• agent blue is delayed by her,
• green agents are on time,
• gold agents are delayed by greens.
Fig. 1. Loosener for (RO) from trigger (e, r) to consequences (g1, rg1), . . . , (gm, rgm):
Starting from edge e, there is a path of m + 1 edges e, f0, f1, . . . , fm. Besides, from
any edge fj (1 ≤ j ≤ m), there is a path fj , fj,α, fj,β , fj,γ1 , fj,γ2 , . . . , gj to consequence
gj . (How many fj,γℓ edges is specified later.) Agents are as follows. Every agent only
has one possible path from his source to his sink. We represent their sources, starting
times and sinks by respectively squares, a number near the square and a diamond. A
dark agent only travels edge e on round r. A blue agent travels from edge e on round
r + 1 to edge fm, in the best case crossing edge fj on round r + 2 + j. An arbitrary
number of red agents all try to only cross edge f0 on same round r+2. On every path
fj , fj,α, fj,β, there is a different green agent traveling it, starting from round r + 2+ j
on edge fj . Finally, on every path fj,β , fj,γ1 , fj,γ2 , . . . , gj , there is a gold agent traveling
it, starting on edge fj,β from round r+ 4+ j, and in the best case arriving on edge gj
on round rgj . (Hence, there are rgj − (r + 5 + j) edges fj,γℓ .) The overall tiebreaking
order on agents is defined so that: blue ≻ green ≻ gold ≻ red ≻ dark ≻ agent i.
Proof (Lemma 1, under (RO)). If agent i enters edge e on round r, she gets
queued before agent blue (but after dark) since she arrives one round earlier
than blue. Hence, blue is delayed one round, and then much more by red agents.
Therefore, there are no collisions between blue and the m green agents, who
are then on time. Consequently, when a green starts from edge fj on round
r + 2 + j, then she enters edge fj,β on round r + 4 + j and induces a delay on
the corresponding gold agent who enters edge gj on round rgj + 1.
If agent i does not enter edge e on round r, then blue enters edge f0 on round
r+2 before the red agents (by priority). Because of every collision blue and the
greens on edges fj at times r+2+ j, and because of priority blue ≻ green, every
green agent is delayed by one round. Consequently, no green agent collides with
any gold agent. Therefore, every gold agent enters his edge gj on round rgj .
If agent i tries to go through the loosener from round r or later (in order to
take a shortcut to some consequence edge), because of dark’s priority on her, i
enters edge f0 at round r+2 or later. Unfortunately, the arbitrarily large number
of red agents have priority over her and she gets queued after them. ⊓⊔
Lemma 2. FRoG/R/Br is NP-complete under (RO) and (RR).
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x1 x2 x3 xm xm+1
¬x1 ¬x2 ¬x3 ¬xm
x1 x2 x3 xm
C1 C2 C3 Cp Cp+1
psi s
∗
i
Loosener from ¬x2 on
clauses that contain it.
trigger by literal ¬x2
consequences on clauses
that contain this literal:
reduced delay for agent i
Fig. 2. Reduction from decision problem 3SAT to FRoG/R/Br under (RO) and (RR):
Let a 3SAT instance be defined by a list of m binary variables x1, . . . , xm and a list
of p 3-clauses C1, . . . , Cp. A 3-clause is a disjunction of three literals (e.g. Cj = x1 ∨
¬x2 ∨ ¬x3). We reduce it to a FRoG/R/Br instance (digraph, agents, priority and
threshold). In the digraph, there is a sequence ofm+1 nodes x1, . . . , xm, xm+1, followed
by a sequence of p+ 1 nodes C1, . . . , Cp, Cp+1. Between any nodes xk and xk+1, there
are two two-edge paths. (Each path represents a choice of valuation for variable xk:
true or false.) From node xm+1 to node C1, there is one path with p edges. Between
any nodes Cj and Cj+1, there are three two-edge paths that represent the three literals
of clause Cj . Agent i aims at traveling from source node x1 to sink node Cp+1; firstly
through m choices of valuation for variables, towards node xm+1 and then C1; secondly
through one literal per node Cj , until she reaches node Cp. Traveling the first edge of
any choice of valuation/literal for variable xk during round r = 3(k−2) loosens on every
clause Cj that contains this literal, the arrival time of an agent with higher priority
than i, from round 3m+ p+2j to round 3m+ p+2j+1. Traveling from vertices x1 to
C1 takes constant time 3m+ p. The cost for traveling from vertices Cj to Cj+1 is two
are three, depending on whether a literal was loosened. The question is whether agent
i can travel from vertex x1 to Cp+1 in less than θ = 3m+ 3p rounds.
Proof (Lemma 2, under (RO)). A path πi with total delay below θ is a yes-
certificate that can be verified in polynomial-time, hence FRoG/R/Br belongs
to NP. We show hardness by a reduction from decision problem 3SAT, entirely
described in Fig. 2, and proved below, first under rules (RO).
(yes⇒yes) Assume a satisfactory instantiation of variables for the 3SAT in-
stance, and let agent i travel from vertices x1 to xm+1 accordingly. (It takes two
rounds on every trigger and one round on the next edge, hence 3m rounds in
total.) Since every clause Cj is satisfied by at least one literal (out of three), it
means that between Cj and Cj+1, at least one path has its cost loosened from
three to two, path that agent i takes on right time 3m + p + 2j. Therefore her
total delay is 3m+ 3p.
(yes⇐yes) Assume a path with total delay no larger than 3m + 3p, hence
equal to it. It means that for every clause Cj , at least one delay was loosened
(on the right time) by a successful choice of path/instantiation between vertices
x1 and xm+1, which gives us an instantiation that satisfies the 3SAT instance.
⊓⊔
Proof (Generalization of Lemma 1 and 2 from rule (RO) to rule (RR)). Both
proofs generalize to rule (RR) by using the same construction. For (RR), it
suffices to keep the same overall order over agents, and to observe that since
10 A. Ismaili
x1 x2 x3 xm xm+1
y1 y2 y3 ym ym+1
C1 C2 C3 Cp Cp+1
p
∃-player
∀-player
s∃ s
∗
∃
s∀ s
∗
∀
Loosen ¬x1
Loosen ¬x2
Loosen ¬x3
Loosen ¬xm
Loosen x1
Loosen x2
Loosen x3
Loosen xm
Fig. 3. Reduction from decision problem QSAT to FRoG/R/Win : Let a QSAT in-
stance be defined by a list of m quantified binary variables Q1x1, . . . , Qmxm with
Qk ∈ {∃,∀} and a list of p 3-clauses C1, . . . , Cp with literals defined on any variable.
E.g.: ∃x1∀x2∃x3∀x4(x1∨¬x3∨x4)∧(¬x2∨x3∨x4)∧(¬x2∨¬x3∨¬x4)∧(¬x1∨x2∨¬x4).
We reduce it to a FRoG/R/Win instance similar to Figure 2, with the following
changes and additions. A new agent who goes from vertices y1 to ym+1 is created, in
order to model the universal player of the formula. If a binary variable xk has quantifier
∃ (resp. ∀), then the same two literal-choosing two-edge paths as in Fig. 2 are created
from vertex xk to xk+1 (resp. from vertex yk to yk+1), and a unique path of three edges
is created from vertex yk to yk+1 (resp. from vertex xk to xk+1). Similarly to Fig. 2,
when an agent takes a literal-choosing path from xk to xk+1 (or from yk to yk+1), in
clauses Cj that contain this literal in a path to Cj+1, it loosens the delay from three
rounds to two, during round 3m+ p+ 2j. Is there a strategy for the existential player
to reach sink Cp+1 in less than θ = 3m+ 3p, whatever the universal player decides?
agent i is the only one to be strategical13, no simultaneous decisions occur under
(RO), hence rules (RO) and (RR) are here strategically equivalent. ⊓⊔
We are now ready to state the proof of Th. 1 under rules (RO) and (RR).
Proof (Theorem 1). We show membership to PSPACE by the following minimax
algorithm from combinatorial game theory. Given a FRoG and a threshold θ,
we must decide whether there is a (winning) strategy σi for agent i that gives
her total delay at most Ci(σi,σ−i) ≤ θ for any adversary strategies σ−i. To do
so, we explore game-tree Γ = (H,Q) recursively, by computing on any subgame
Γ [H(r)] the best value guaranteed for agent i in Γ [H(r)], as follows. If she is
the only agent in MH(r) (to make a decision at this round), then she decides a
next edge e that optimizes her total delay according to the values of consecutive
subgames Γ ((H(r), Q(r+1))). If she does not belong to deciding agents MH(r),
then we take the worst value on all consecutive subgames Γ ((H(r), Q(r + 1))).
If there are several agents in MH(r) including her, then a new edge for agent i is
evaluated by considering the worst case of what the other agents in MH(r) may
decide. In this optimization process with alternating minima and maxima, agent
i reaches her sink in a polynomial number of edges (because that is her interest),
13 The others have singleton strategy-sets: a single path from source to sink.
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whatever strategies the other agents choose, even the weirdest non-finishing ones
(for them). Consequently, we only explore a finite subset of subgames and the
(interesting part of the) game tree only has polynomial-depth. Therefore, running
a depth-first search takes (a long time, but) polynomial-space.
We show hardness for PSPACE by a many-one reduction from decision prob-
lem QSAT (also known as TQBF), depicted in Figure 3. A QSAT instance is de-
fined by a list ofm quantified binary variablesQ1x1, . . . , Qmxm with Qk ∈ {∃, ∀}
and a list of p 3-clauses C1, . . . , Cp with literals defined on any variable. It asks
whether the following formula is true:Q1x1, Q2x2, . . . , Qmxm, C1∧C2∧. . .∧Cp.
It is well known that the validity of a QSAT formula can be interpreted as a
zero-sum game between an existential player and a universal player [PY91, Proof
of Th. 4.1]. The formula is true (resp. false) if and only if the existential (resp.
universal) player has a winning strategy for instantiating variables. Here, the
universal player is overall indifferent between all the paths from y1 to ym+1, and
may decide any strategy on universally quantified variables. Since no simultane-
ous actions occur in our construct, it holds for both rules (RO) and (RR), by
strategical equivalence.
(yes⇒yes) In the QSAT instance, if the existential player has a winning
strategy against the universal player, the existential agent plays it on the path
from vertex x1 to xm+1, by observing sequentially what the other agent decides
from vertex y1 to ym+1. Since the formula is satisfied, between any vertex Cj
and Cj+1, there is at least one path loosened on the right round 3m+ p+2j for
the existential agent to travel from vertex C1 to Cp+1 in 2p rounds.
(yes⇐yes) Assume that there is a path strategy for the existential agent from
vertex x1 to xm+1 such that whatever edges the universal agent decides between
y1 and ym+1, the delay from vertex C1 to Cp+1 is 2p rounds. Then, between every
vertices Cj , Cj+1, at least one literal-path is loosened. Therefore, the existential
player in QSAT has the same winning strategy: the formula is true. ⊓⊔
We now show a deeper negative result on the inapproximability of FRoGs
under simultaneous and sequential rules (RO) and (RR).
Theorem 2. It is PSPACE-hard to approximate the optimization version of
FRoG/R/Win within n1−ε for any ε > 0, and within any polynomial of |V |,
under both simultaneous and sequential tiebreaking rules (RO) and (RR).
Proof (Theorem 2). Starting from QSAT, we reuse the same reduction as for
Theorem 1 (Figure 3), and append one last edge after vertex Cp+1 that the
existential agent should cross to reach her goal. A number M of agents enter
this last edge on same round 3m + 3p + 2, with higher priority than agent i.
Hence, either agent i succeeds in having total delay OPT = 3m+ 3p+ 1, either
she fails and obtains total delay OPT + M . The resulting problem contains
|V | = poly(m, p) vertices and n = poly(m, p) +M agents.
If the QSAT formula is a yes-instance, then the optimum for agent i is 3m+
3p + 1, and an n1−ε-approximation algorithm should return a solution within
OPT(poly(m, p)+M)1−ε, which turns out to be strictly less than OPT+M for
M large enough and still polynomial in (m, p). So the only approximate solution
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becomes the optimum. If the formula is a no, then total delay is the other one:
3m+ 3p+ 1 +M . Consequently, n1−ε-approximation is PSPACE-hard.
Similarly, assume a q(|V |)-approximation algorithm for any polynomial q.
If the QSAT formula is a yes-instance, then it should return a solution within
OPTq(|V |), which is strictly less than OPT+M for a large enough polynomial
M(m, p). Therefore, q(|V |)-approximation is also PSPACE-hard. ⊓⊔
4 The Complexity of Subgame Perfect Equilibrium
In this section, we settle the computational complexity of subgame perfect equi-
librium in FRoGs under simultaneous actions (RO) and sequential actions (RR).
Theorem 3. Decision problem FRoG/RO/Exist is PSPACE-complete, and
function problem FRoG/RR/Find is also PSPACE-hard and in FPSPACE.
Proof (Theorem 3). We show membership to PSPACE or FPSPACE by the
same algorithm, which recursively explores game-tree Γ = (H,Q) as follows.
In the process, we only approve sequential (resp. simultaneous) decision nodes
H(r) where (the) agent(s) in MH(r) can play a best-response (resp. pure Nash
equilibrium) that leads to a subgame Γ (H(r), Q(r+1)) that contains an SPE. In
order to only explore a finite subset of subgames, one can cut the sub-trees where
an agent went into a dead-end or where an agent’s current delay (that is: current
round r) is already more than |E|×|N |. Indeed, these subtrees are obviously not
in the best individual interest of those agents, since even a blind strategy can
do better whatever the others’ strategies. Consequently, these subtrees cannot
contain an SPE. Because of this cut, the game tree only has polynomial depth.
Therefore, a depth-first search takes polynomial-space (but a lot of time).
For function problem FRoG/RR/Find, we show PSPACE-hardness by turn-
ing Figure 3 into a zero-sum game between the existential and universal agents:
It suffices to add one last edge e on both strategical agents’ paths (reachable in
some constant delay from vertices Cp+1 and ym+1). On this edge, the universal
agent (who was overall indifferent) is now delayed by one round if and only if the
existential agent travels from vertex C1 to Cp+1 in 2p rounds (formula satisfied)
and then collides with her on edge e. Since any winning strategy is always played
in an SPE, the induced paths indicate whether the formula is true or false.
For decision problem FRoG/RO/Exist, we proceed from Figure 3 as for
FRoG/RR/Find, with the following addition: If the universal agent is de-
layed, then she is synchronized to collide with and cancel out counter-example
[CCCW17b, Fig. 2] (e.g. by delaying an agent therein). Therefore, if the formula
is a yes (resp. no), the universal agent is delayed, the counter-example is (resp.
not) canceled and the FRoG/RO/Exist instance is a yes (resp. no). ⊓⊔
5 Conclusion
In this paper, for sequential routing games, under simultaneous and sequential
tiebreaking rules (RO) and (RR), we settle the computational complexity of the
The Complexity of Sequential Routing Games 13
winning strategy problem as PSPACE-complete. PSPACE-hardness of subgame
perfect equilibrium is a consequence of the complexity of winning strategies.
Interestingly, under tiebreaking rule (RE), where there are priorities on in-
coming edges, rather than on agents, the best-response problem turns out P-
time tractable (see Th. 4 below). This result contrasts with intractability results
Lemma 2 and [Ism17, Th. 3-5] which assume a tie-breaking order on agents.
Rule (RE) (first proposed in [CCCW17b]) turns out to be a sane model that
does not favor agents by their IDs. Hence, it will be worth studying further.
Theorem 4. Best-response problem FRoG/RE/Br is in P.
Proof (Theorem 4). Let us run an initializing event-based Dijkstra-style algo-
rithm on G = (V,E) with adversary paths pi−i. It provides us with congestions
Qe(r) of every queue e and every round r, in polynomial-time.
We now consider augmented graph G = ({si} ∪ E, E). Every vertex v ∈
V is augmented into origin-vertex couple (u, v) ∈ E (but the source). In set
E , there is an augmented edge from origin-vertex (u, v) (resp. si) to origin-
vertex (v, w) (resp. (si, w)) if the former’s vertex (head) is the later’s origin
(tail). Costs are dynamically defined as follows: If agent i decides next edge
e = (v, w) from origin-vertex (u, v) during round r, then she reaches w on round
r + |Qe(r + 1)| − |P(u,v,w)(r + 1)| + 1, where Qe(r + 1) is known from the first
algorithm (without agent i), and agent set P(u,v,w)(r+1) ⊆ Qe(r+1) are those
entering edge e = (v, w) on same round r+1 as agent i, but from an origin/edge
with lower priority than (u, v) (hence i passes them).
First, let us assume that agent i (whose shortest path we compute) does not
incur any queue modification that she causes (as in Fig. 1). In augmented graph
G, despite the fact that costs are dynamic, agent i has no interest in arriving
one round later in any waiting list, since it is the maximal rate at which a queue
empties. We can then directly run Dijkstra’s algorithm on G.
Under tiebreaking rule (RE), any path has same delay for any agent, since
delays only depend on when and where they come from, rather than their IDs
(like in rules (RO) and (RR)). Consequently, on a shortest path, agent i can
always go at least faster than the chain of queue-modifications that she triggers,
by (for instance) taking the same modified path. The frog passes Mach one and
crosses roads without (new) collisions (Easter egg). Therefore, on shortest paths,
she never incurs any queue modification that she caused, as assumed above. ⊓⊔
Acknowledgments I am grateful to Ilan Nehama for his enthusiasm, to
Silvia De Bellis for proofreading and to the anonymous reviewers for their tedious
work. Following recent open practices, reviews will be appended to a preprint.
References
AAE05. Baruch Awerbuch, Yossi Azar, and Amir Epstein. The Price of Rout-
ing Unsplittable Flow. In Proceedings of the thirty-seventh annual ACM
symposium on Theory of computing, pages 57–66. ACM, 2005.
14 A. Ismaili
AU09. Elliot Anshelevich and Satish Ukkusuri. Equilibria in Dynamic Selfish
Routing. In International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory, pages
171–182. Springer, 2009.
BEDL06. Avrim Blum, Eyal Even-Dar, and Katrina Ligett. Routing without regret:
On convergence to Nash equilibria of regret-minimizing algorithms in rout-
ing games. In Proceedings of the twenty-fifth annual ACM symposium on
Principles of distributed computing, pages 45–52. ACM, 2006.
CCCW17a. Zhigang Cao, Bo Chen, Xujin Chen, and Changjun Wang. A Network
Game of Dynamic Traffic. In Proceedings of the 2017 ACM Conference
on Economics and Computation, EC ’17, pages 695–696. ACM, 2017.
CCCW17b. Zhigang Cao, Bo Chen, Xujin Chen, and Changjun Wang. A Network
Game of Dynamic Traffic. CoRR, abs/1705.01784, 2017.
CK05. George Christodoulou and Elias Koutsoupias. The Price of Anarchy of
Finite Congestion Games. In Proceedings of the thirty-seventh annual
ACM symposium on Theory of computing, pages 67–73. ACM, 2005.
CS11. Steve Chien and Alistair Sinclair. Convergence to approximate Nash equi-
libria in congestion games. Games and Economic Behavior, 71(2):315–327,
2011.
GJ79. M.R. Garey and D.S. Johnson. Computers and Intractability, volume 174.
Freeman San Francisco, CA, 1979.
HHP06. Tobias Harks, Stefan Heinz, and Marc E Pfetsch. Competitive Online
Multicommodity Routing. In International Workshop on Approximation
and Online Algorithms, pages 240–252. Springer, 2006.
HHP09. Tobias Harks, Stefan Heinz, and Marc E Pfetsch. Competitive Online
Multicommodity Routing. Theory of Computing Systems, 45(3):533–554,
2009.
HMRT09. Martin Hoefer, Vahab Mirrokni, Heiko Ro¨glin, and Shang-Hua Teng. Com-
petitive Routing over Time. Internet and Network Economics, pages 18–
29, 2009.
HMRT11. Martin Hoefer, Vahab S Mirrokni, Heiko Ro¨glin, and Shang-Hua
Teng. Competitive Routing over Time. Theoretical Computer Science,
412(39):5420–5432, 2011.
HPS+18. Tobias Harks, Britta Peis, Daniel Schmand, Bjoern Tauer, and Laura Var-
gas Koch. Competitive Packet Routing with Priority Lists. ACM Trans.
Econ. Comput., 6(1):4:1–4:26, March 2018.
HPSVK16. Tobias Harks, Britta Peis, Daniel Schmand, and Laura Vargas Koch. Com-
petitive Packet Routing with Priority Lists. In LIPIcs-Leibniz Interna-
tional Proceedings in Informatics, volume 58. Schloss Dagstuhl-Leibniz-
Zentrum fuer Informatik, 2016.
Ism17. Anisse Ismaili. Routing Games over Time with FIFO Policy. In Nikhil
R. Devanur and Pinyan Lu, editors, Web and Internet Economics, pages
266–280, Cham, 2017. Springer International Publishing.
KP99. Elias Koutsoupias and Christos Papadimitriou. Worst-Case Equilibria. In
STACS, volume 99, pages 404–413. Springer, 1999.
KS09. Ronald Koch and Martin Skutella. Nash Equilibria and the Price of An-
archy for Flows over Time. In International Symposium on Algorithmic
Game Theory, pages 323–334. Springer, 2009.
KS11. Ronald Koch and Martin Skutella. Nash Equilibria and the Price of An-
archy for Flows over Time. Theory of Computing Systems, 49(1):71–97,
2011.
The Complexity of Sequential Routing Games 15
MBP17. Barnabe´ Monnot, Francisco Benita, and Georgios Piliouras. Routing
games in the wild: Efficiency, equilibration and regret. In International
Conference on Web and Internet Economics, pages 340–353. Springer,
2017.
NRTV07. Noam Nisan, Tim Roughgarden, Eva Tardos, and Vijay V Vazirani. Algo-
rithmic Game Theory, volume 1. Cambridge University Press Cambridge,
2007.
PV10. Christos H Papadimitriou and Gregory Valiant. A New Look at Selfish
Routing. In ICS, pages 178–187, 2010.
PY91. Christos H. Papadimitriou and Mihalis Yannakakis. Shortest paths with-
out a map. Theoretical Computer Science, 84(1):127 – 150, 1991.
Rou05. Tim Roughgarden. Selfish Routing and the Price of Anarchy, volume 174.
Cambridge MIT press, 2005.
Rou09. Tim Roughgarden. Intrinsic Robustness of the Price of Anarchy. In Pro-
ceedings of the forty-first annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing,
pages 513–522. ACM, 2009.
RT02. Tim Roughgarden and E´va Tardos. How Bad is Selfish Routing? Journal
of the ACM (JACM), 49(2):236–259, 2002.
War52. John Glen Wardrop. Some Theoretical Aspects of Road Traffic Research.
Proceedings of the institution of civil engineers, 1(3):325–362, 1952.
WHK14. TL Werth, M Holzhauser, and SO Krumke. Atomic Routing in a Deter-
ministic Queuing Model. Operations Research Perspectives, 1(1):18–41,
2014.
A Reviews from WINE-2018
Summary of reviews by the author
I am grateful to the anonymous reviewers for reading the paper, for their tedious
work and their constructive comments. I will follow their advises to extend this
work, mainly as follows:
+ Additional conceptual contributions are required, for instance: positive re-
sults. This may be achieved by studying the tie breaking rule on incoming
edges, that was only explored informally in this work. Focusing on simple
compact strategies may also reveal interesting.
+ Current results must be written in a more formal, precise and clear way.
+ Related work should be rewritten more clearly, taking into account the name
clash with other models of sequential routing games in literature.
It goes without saying that all minor comments will be addressed. For the sake of
transparency and valorisation of anonymous work, the full reviews are provided
below.
A.1 Review 1
In this paper, the authors study a routing game with a time-component where
every edge acts as a queue. Every time step, the player in the front of the queue
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of an edge enters the end of the queue of the next edge he chooses. Sometimes,
multiple players want to enter the same queue at the same time step. Various
tie breaking rules are then considered: One where tie breaking is determined
through an global agent order, one where the tie breaking is over the incoming
edges of each vertex, and one where players choose their next edge sequentially
over a global agent order (and hence can let their next choice of edge depend on
the preceding agents in the order).
Players want to get from their source to their sink as quick as possible, and
strategy of a player thus maps a configuration history to a choice of a new
adjacent edge whenever the player is on the top of a queue. Hence, an SPE may
exist in such games and it definitely exists under the third tie-breaking rule when
only one agent moves each turn.
The paper then gives various hardness and completeness results: It shows that
under the first and third tie breaking rules it is PSPACE-complete to determine
whether a player has a strategy below a given threshold, and it is NP-complete
if the strategies of the other players are given. Furthermore, this result is ex-
tended (quite straightforwardly) to some inapproximability results with a big
inapproximability factors n1−eps and any poly(|V |). The authors also show that
existence of an SPE with tie-breaking rule 1 is PSPACE-complete and finding
(the resulting outcome of) one in case of rule 3 is PSPACE hard.
Lastly, the authors show in the conclusion section that computing a best
response for a player is in P in case the second tie-breaking rule is used. This
result is not announced at all in the rest of the paper, and since this is the only
”good news” the paper has to offer, I think it is not the best choice to hide this
result at the very end of the paper.
All of the hardness results are centered around a reduction gadget which the
authors call a ”loosener”. This ”loosener” construction essentially enables the
authors to encode various interrelations between various edges in a graph: It
encodes that if an agent is able to reach an edge within a particular time step,
then he can traverse a set of various other edges one time unit quicker. What I
wrote just now is by the way an easy intuition behind the gadget, that I found
missing from the paper. I think it would be very helpful to add such a high-level
explanation to the paper.
The paper is entirely built around this idea of a ”loosener”, and using it to
reduce a TQBF formula to these routing game problems. The main reduction is
not that straightforward though. I am not sure if the result is that surprising or
technically deep, but it is reasonably involved.
Regarding the writing quality of the paper, I think that there is much room
for improvement. The English language is sometimes used in a way that is a bit
weird, with a strange choice of words and terminology sometimes. On the techni-
cal side there are further shortcomings in the writing. In the proofs the authors
often opt for explaining things in a not-entirely-precise way, and try to avoid
formal notation, apparently in the hope that the reader has the same intuition
as the authors when reading through their text. I think that is a mistake. An
example is the way they define the concept of a ”loosener”; the choice of term
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is not really clearly motivated in the paper, and after introducing the reduction
gadget the authors start to use ”to loosen” as a verb throughout the text, with-
out really making clear what that means. There is more of this puzzling stuff
throughout the paper and I give some more examples in the list below. Also
the main reductions are merely ”described” o! r maybe even ”sketched”, rather
than precisely defined, where this description is deferred to pictures and their
informal expostition in the captions. These captions are way too long, by the
way.
For the discussion of related literature, the authors mention a lot of papers,
but at the end of the discussion it was somehow still very unclear to me how
the model that is studied here connects more or less to the other works out
there. It is not clear to me if this particular model is studied before and how
these other papers more or less related to it. Also I want to point out that there
is another notion of a ”sequential game” in the literature, which the authors
do not mention: this concept has been introduced in the paper ”The curse of
simultaneity” by Paes Leme et al. and subsequently ”sequential routing games”
have been studied in two previous WINE papers by De Jong and Uetz (2014),
and by Correa et al. (2015). The models are different from the one studied here,
but they do involve SPEs, and also simply because of the name clash I think
this should be discussed.
For all the reasons combined I am not very convinced that the paper is
currently in a proper state to be published. I am hoping that the authors could
take a more careful look at how they can best write all of their results down in
a precise and clear way, and I very much hope for some additional conceptual
contributions besides only this central PSPACE-hardness reduction. Some news
on the positive side, maybe for the second variant of tie-breaking rule, would be
very welcome.
Here is a list of further remarks, suggestions, and corrections.
- behaviors → behavior
- travels → travel
- ”in delays calculations”: i think nothing is really being ”calculated” here.
- ”complexity of games”: Is a game necessarily more complex with temporal-
ity, or is it just different? Does the non-existence of equilibria necessarily mean
that things are more complex? Does hardness of computing equilibria in a class
of games imply that the game itself is more complex?
- intractable; the → intractable, and the (also, provide references to these
claims)
- a last → another
- was related → was modeled to be related
- ”It is also reminded” sounds strange. Maybe ”We also note”?
- ”in real life”. Also this sounds weird: The paper [MBP17] itself obviously
exists ”in real life”.
- I am not sure why you mention the Canadian Traveler Problem, as any
further relation of your results to that problem seems missing.
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- ”W.l.o.g. on negative results”, the ”W.l.o.g.” here depends on the scope of
games that you want to capture, which you did not define.
- The extensive use of footnotes might be a bit too much, and I do think
some of these footnotes would be better placed in the main text.
- ”Here is the main loop:” Remove this.
- ”Strategical” is a bit of an uncommon term. I think ”strategic” sounds
much more natural.
- Is the notion of a ”trivial” player used anywhere, and is it important to any
of the results?
- representing it → and representing it
- edge, function → edge, which is a function
- ”Given strategy-profile σ, agents play their strategies on the game.” This
is a sort of empty sentence. It does not say anything.
- ”by mapping from path profile”. I do not understand what this means.
- ”has this number”. Has which number?
- by mean of → by means of
- ”Dijkstra-style pop-the-next-event algorithm”. This seems very specialized
and I do not think you can assume that the reader knows what you mean here.
Please elaborate.
- What is MH(r) in Def. 7? (Ignore this if you defined this earlier in the
paper.)
- ”since it is in players’ interests”. This is a very vague statement. You use
this term ”interests” and things like ”because it is in her interests” multiple
times in the paper and I think you should try to avoid it and be more precise.
- round, induces → round induces
- ”(as an empty concept here)”: what does this mean?
- Define what you mean with ”length function” (I don’t think this is a very
standard term).
- guaranteed → guaranteed to exist
- ”formalizable” is not the correct word. All that you talk about is entirely
formalizable. Perhaps you mean something like ”sensible”.
- ”adversary”. Remove this (twice).
- Try to restate Lemma 1 in a precise and clear way, especially the last
sentence is confusing to the reader who does not (yet) understand what the
purpose of a ”loosener” is. Also things like ”trigger-edge” and ”consequence-
edge/round” are a bit mystifying.
- In the definition of a loosener, contrary to how the model was introduced,
starting times are suddenly associated to the players, which is confusing.
- The meaning of the bold edges in the picture is not clear. Only much later I
realized that a loosener is defined with respect to an existing network, and that
these bold edges are edges in that network.
- ”two are three”?
- under rules → under rule
- ”including her”. Who is ”her”?
- ”because that is in her interest”. See my remark above.
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- Page 10 of the proof of Theorem 1: Remove ”even the weirdest non finishing
ones (for them)” and ”(a long time, but)”, since these remarks are unnecessary
and distracting. What do you mean with ”instantiating variables”, and ”our con-
struct”, and a ”winning” strategy against the universal player, and ”observing
sequentially”? What do you mean with ”the same winning strategy: the formula
is true.”? (”the formula is true” is not a strategy...)
- In the proof of Theorem 2, should not OPT + M be OPT + M + 1?
- I have the feeling that the encoding you use for the decision problems, such
as ”FRoG/RO/Exist” is not necessary and detrimental to the quality of this
paper. I found myself jumping back and forth to the point where these codes are
described.
- Proof of Theorem 3: what do you mean with the ”same” algorithm? ”which”
→ ”that”. ”cut the sub-trees”: I think you mean ”prune”. Be a bit more precise
about ”when an agent went into a dead-end”. ”the best individual interest”: see
above. What is a ”blind strategy”? What does it mean for a subtree to ”contain”
an equilibrium? What do you mean with ”this cut” (do you mean something
like ”this pruning rule”?)? Remove ”but a lot of time”. What does ”delayed”
mean? The last paragraph about a particular counter-example in the paper
[CCCW17b] is not acceptable as a proof. The definition background behind this
counterexample should then be given, and it should be explained why it would
be acceptable to just ”cancel out” a particular counter-example. Lastly, I would
suggest to find a different way of expressing an instance ”being a yes” or ”a no”
as you currently do.
- tiebreaking → tie-breaking
- explain what you mean with ”sane”
- Proof of Theorem 4: explain what you mean with an ”initializing event-
based Dijkstra-style algorithm”. What do you mean with ”augmented”. ”(but
the source)”: But the source what? ”later’s” → ”latter’s”. What is this strange
sentence about a frog passing Mach one near the end of the proof? Easter egg???
- In the acknowledgments, which of the authors is ”I”?
- In the acknowledgments, you announce that you want to somehow publish
the reviews. If there is a rebuttal possible to this review, I would be genuinely
interested in understanding why the authors would like to do this? I do not really
see the point of it.
A.2 Review 2
The authors consider sequential routing games, where players decide which arc
to use at each node, instead of choosing the entire source-sink-path at once, as
in most routing models. The sequential model feels more natural, as players only
incur delays when they share arcs with other players at the same time (round).
The results are non-trivial, mostly (but not always) clearly explained, and
seem to be correct. However, most of the results are kind of similar to earlier work
(Ism17). Also, the are some (minor) shortcomings with respect to organization
of the paper as well as langauge.
Detailed comments:
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-Related work that may be of interest is ’The curse of sequentiality in routing
games, WINE 2015’, which also considers the complexity of finding SPE’s in
routing games.
-Introduction: ’agents incur congestion to one another’ You cannot incur
something to someone; incurring means having it yourself.
-It took me a while to realize that agent i can exit the loosener either after arc
e, or after any of the g-arcs. It would be helpful to explain this more thoroughly,
and also show this in Figure 1.
-Theorem 4 is first mentioned (and proven) in the conclusion. I don’t think
the conclusion is the right place for a proof.
A.3 Review 3
The paper studies the computational complexity of a sequential routing game
inspired by the dynamic routing model recently introduced in (Car et al., EC
2017). There is an underlying network and the players have different origins and
destinations. Each edge operates as a priority queue and has unit length and
unit capacity. The new thing is that the players decide on their paths in a hop-
by-hop basis, by making local decisions. So, in each round, all agents on top of
their queues (as determined by some priority policy) decide on the next hop of
their paths based on the history of the game. The individual cost of each player
is the number of rounds required to reach his destination.
The paper shows that if (players have different origins and destinations and)
priorities are based on player ids, this game is hard to play / solve. Specifi-
cally, the paper shows that computing a best-response path, based on perfect
knowledge about the paths selected by others, is NP-hard. Moreover, comput-
ing any reasonable approximation to a best-response strategy and determining
whether the game admits an SPE are PSPACE-hard and PSPACE-complete, re-
spectively. And computing the set of paths induced by an SPE is PSPACE-hard
and in FPSPACE. On the other hand, if priorities are based on the edge ids,
we can compute a best-response path efficiently (but we do not know about the
complexity of the best-response strategy and an SPE).
The model of the sequential routing game considered in the paper is natural
and interesting, and the hardness results are definitely good to know. The gadgets
used in the hardness proofs are involved (but tailor-made to the specific priority
rules, so probably not useful in other similar settings) and the proofs are far
from trivial.
My main concern is that the results might not be so interesting for the
WINE community because (i) they apply to specific priority rules (player-based
priority rules - the general picture might be very different if the priority rules are
edge-based), and (ii) they are not accompanied by some positive results (with
the exception of Thm. 4, in the conclusions) which would indicate that this
is a reasonable model for rational and computationally-restricted players. So I
believe that this is a rather borderline paper for WINE.
A comment for the authors:
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- Related work section is not well organized (especially the first and the last
paragraphs). If the authors feel obliged to discuss all these models and results,
they should organize the section in a way that helps the reader to navigate
through them.
